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		<title>ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES)</title>
		<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3447538</link>
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			<title>ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems (TODAES) - Survey Paper</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3447538</link>
			<description />
			<pubDate>Sat, 31 Jul 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
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			<title>Efficient One-pass Synthesis for Digital Microfluidic Biochips</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3446880</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Naser Mohammadzadeh, Robert Wille, Oliver Keszocze<br /><br />Digital microfluidics biochips are a promising emerging technology that provides fluidic experimental capabilities on a chip (i.e., following the lab-on-a-chip paradigm). However, the design of such biochips still constitutes a challenging task that is usually tackled by multiple individual design steps, such as binding, scheduling, placement, and routing. Performing these steps consecutively may lead to design gaps and infeasible results. To address these shortcomings, the concept of one-pass design for digital microfluidics biochips has recently been proposed&#x02014;a holistic approach avoiding the design gaps by considering the whole synthesis process as large. But implementations of this concept available thus far suffer from either high computational effort or costly results.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
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			<title>Design Automation for Tree-based Nearest Neighborhood&#x02013;aware Placement of High-speed Cellular Automata on FPGA with Scan Path Insertion</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3446206</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Ayan Palchaudhuri, Sandeep Sharma, Anindya Sundar Dhar<br /><br />Cellular Automata (CA) is attractive for high-speed VLSI implementation due to modularity, cascadability, and locality of interconnections confined to neighboring logic cells. However, this outcome is not easily transferable to tree-structured CA, since the neighbors having half and double the index value of the current CA cell under question can be sufficiently distanced apart on the FPGA floor. Challenges to meet throughput requirements, seamlessly translate algorithmic modifications for changing application specifications to gate level architectures and to address reliability challenges of semiconductor chips are ever increasing. Thus, a proper design framework assisting automation of synthesizable, delay-optimized VLSI architecture descriptions facilitating testability is desirable.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
			<guid isPermaLink="false">3446206</guid>
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			<title>Security Threat Analyses and Attack Models for Approximate Computing Systems: From Hardware and Micro-architecture Perspectives</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3442380</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Pruthvy Yellu, Landon Buell, Miguel Mark, Michel A. Kinsy, Dongpeng Xu, Qiaoyan Yu<br /><br />Approximate computing (AC) represents a paradigm shift from conventional precise processing to inexact computation but still satisfying the system requirement on accuracy. The rapid progress on the development of diverse AC techniques allows us to apply approximate computing to many computation-intensive applications. However, the utilization of AC techniques could bring in new unique security threats to computing systems. This work does a survey on existing circuit-, architecture-, and compiler-level approximate mechanisms/algorithms, with special emphasis on potential security vulnerabilities. Qualitative and quantitative analyses are performed to assess the impact of the new security threats on AC systems. Moreover, this work proposes four unique visionary attack models, which systematically cover the attacks that build covert channels, compensate approximation errors, terminate normal error resilience mechanisms, and propagate additional errors.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
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			<title>Security Assessment of Dynamically Obfuscated Scan Chain Against Oracle-guided Attacks</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3444960</link>
			<description><![CDATA[M Sazadur Rahman, Adib Nahiyan, Fahim Rahman, Saverio Fazzari, Kenneth Plaks, Farimah Farahmandi, Domenic Forte, Mark Tehranipoor<br /><br />Logic locking has emerged as a promising solution to protect integrated circuits against piracy and tampering. However, the security provided by existing logic locking techniques is often thwarted by Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based oracle-guided attacks. Criteria for successful SAT attacks on locked circuits include: (i) the circuit under attack is fully combinational, or (ii) the attacker has scan chain access. To address the threat posed by SAT-based attacks, we adopt the dynamically obfuscated scan chain (DOSC) architecture and illustrate its resiliency against the SAT attacks when inserted into the scan chain of an obfuscated design. We demonstrate, both mathematically and experimentally, that DOSC exponentially increases the resiliency against key extraction by SAT attack and its variants.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
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			<title>Design Space Optimization of Shared Memory Architecture in Accelerator-rich Systems</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3446001</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Mitali Sinha, Gade Sri Harsha, Pramit Bhattacharyya, Sujay Deb<br /><br />Shared memory architectures, as opposed to private-only memories, provide a viable alternative to meet the ever-increasing memory requirements of multi-accelerator systems to achieve high performance under stringent area and energy constraints. However, an impulsive memory sharing degrades performance due to network contention and latency to access shared memory. We propose the Accelerator Shared Memory (ASM) framework to provide an optimal private/shared memory configuration and shared data allocation under a system&#x02019;s resource and network constraints. Evaluations show ASM provides up to 34.35% and 31.34% improvement in performance and energy, respectively, over baseline systems.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Sat, 13 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
			<guid isPermaLink="false">3446001</guid>
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			<title>TAAL: Tampering Attack on Any Key-based Logic Locked Circuits</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3442379</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Ayush Jain, Ziqi Zhou, Ujjwal Guin<br /><br />Due to the globalization of semiconductor manufacturing and test processes, the system-on-a-chip (SoC) designers no longer design the complete SoC and manufacture chips on their own. This outsourcing of the design and manufacturing of Integrated Circuits (ICs) has resulted in several threats, such as overproduction of ICs, sale of out-of-specification/rejected ICs, and piracy of Intellectual Properties (IPs). Logic locking has emerged as a promising defense strategy against these threats. However, various attacks about the extraction of secret keys have undermined the security of logic locking techniques. Over the years, researchers have proposed different techniques to prevent existing attacks. In this article, we propose a novel attack that can break any logic locking techniques that rely on the stored secret key.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Tue, 09 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
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			<title>Equivalent Faults under Launch-on-Shift (LOS) Tests with Equal Primary Input Vectors</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3440013</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Irith Pomeranz<br /><br />A recent work showed that it is possible to transform a single-cycle test for stuck-at faults into a launch-on-shift (LOS) test that is guaranteed to detect the same stuck-at faults without any logic or fault simulation. The LOS test also detects transition faults. This was used for obtaining a compact LOS test set that detects both types of faults. In the scenario where LOS tests are used for both stuck-at and transition faults, this article observes that, under certain conditions, the detection of a stuck-at fault guarantees the detection of a corresponding transition fault. This implies that the two faults are equivalent under LOS tests.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
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			<title>Directed Test Generation for Activation of Security Assertions in RTL Models</title>
			<link>http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3441297</link>
			<description><![CDATA[Hasini Witharana, Yangdi Lyu, Prabhat Mishra<br /><br />Assertions are widely used for functional validation as well as coverage analysis for both software and hardware designs. Assertions enable runtime error detection as well as faster localization of errors. While there is a vast literature on both software and hardware assertions for monitoring functional scenarios, there is limited effort in utilizing assertions to monitor System-on-Chip (SoC) security vulnerabilities. We have identified common SoC security vulnerabilities and defined several classes of assertions to enable runtime checking of security vulnerabilities. A major challenge in assertion-based validation is how to activate the security assertions to ensure that they are valid. While existing test generation using model checking is promising, it cannot generate directed tests for large designs due to state space explosion.]]></description>
			<pubDate>Fri, 15 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT </pubDate>
			<author />
			<guid isPermaLink="false">3441297</guid>
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